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ABSTRACT: This article challenges strategists to reconsider longheld assumptions associated with the alliance between Belarus and
Russia when planning military support for the Baltic states.

S

ince the Russian annexation of Crimea in early 2014, security
experts have been busy exploring the nature of the current
threat environment facing East Central Europe as well as
identifying appropriate policy responses that the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and its local members could adopt. Much of the
existing analysis has focused on so-called hybrid warfare, the anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) capabilities Russia brings to bear in the region, and
gaps in NATO’s deterrent capabilities. Yet experts have paid insufficient
attention to Russia’s only formal ally in the region, Belarus. At best,
they assume Belarus will participate in—if not just diplomatically
support—any military aggression that its senior ally would undertake
in the region. At worst, they neglect to mention it altogether, with the
implicit understanding that the Belarusian military would be too weak
and the political leadership in Minsk too deferential to the Kremlin to be
of any consequence.
Such expectations regarding Belarus might be wrong, however.
Military-to-military contacts between Belarus and Russia are not as
strong as some analysts assume. More importantly, Belarusian President
Alyaksandr Hrygorevich Lukashenka has diverged from Russia on key
issues relating to territorial disputes in the former Soviet space. He
provided halting diplomatic support to Russia on Georgia and even
bucked the Kremlin’s approach toward Ukraine. Indeed, because of his
country’s positioning between NATO and Russia, he is likely to be riskaverse with regards to military conflict. He may even fear entrapment,
believing that Russia might drag Belarus into a war he would prefer to
avoid. Not only would a war risk Belarusian resources and lives but it
could also create the conditions under which Lukashenka loses power.
Analysts are thus mistaken to believe the alliance between Belarus
and Russia represents a dynamic whereby the strong do what they can
and the weak suffer what they must. Should Belarusian leaders not want
conflict with NATO, they can create costs for Russia. Even if Russia
tries to impose its will on Belarus, either by withholding economic
subsidies or by dislodging Lukashenka from power, then it would do
so at potentially great expense. Any effort to undermine the Belarusian
regime could spark a backlash among members of society. Since such
an effort would suggest Russia is destabilizing Belarus for military
purposes, it would also escalate tensions with NATO.
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Whatever the plausibility of a Russian-led regime change in Belarus,
the prospect of having to deal with a reluctant and militarily deficient
ally could affect Russia’s cost-benefit calculations in challenging the
territorial and political order in East Central Europe. For its part,
NATO should prepare for varying levels of Belarusian involvement.
Holding Belarusian assets at risk may not be necessary if Minsk is able to
hamper Russian war plans. But if Russia succeeds in eliciting Belarusian
cooperation, NATO might feel compelled to target those Belarusian
bases that Russian troops could use as staging areas, thereby further
escalating a crisis. Belarus presents a complicating factor for both sides
with respect to crisis diplomacy and warfighting in the region.

Belarusian Foreign Policy since Independence

Called the last “outpost of tyranny” in Europe, Belarus became
an independent state in 1991 amid the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Lukashenka has ruled the country since 1994 thanks to electoral fraud
as well as the violent suppression of political opposition and media.1
With a domestic policy subject to international condemnation for its
authoritarianism, Lukashenka has historically pursued a close relationship with Russia, even describing himself as a “most loyal ally” to the
Kremlin.2 The two countries forged their alliance through agreements—
the Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborhood, and Cooperation of 1995
and the 1997 Union Treaty—that Lukashenka signed with then-Russian
President Boris Yeltsin. These treaties have provided the framework for
their security cooperation and joint military planning.3
Closeness with Russia served more than just a political-military
purpose, however. For Belarusian leaders, it preserved a certain
level of welfare despite highly unfavorable structural conditions that
characterized the national economy. At least throughout the 1990s,
Belarus maintained high living standards relative to other members of
the Commonwealth of Independent States—the non-Baltic countries
that used to form the Soviet Union.4 Integration with Russia has helped
Belarus sidestep otherwise difficult questions concerning its lack of
independent energy sources and highly militarized, state-managed
economy. Moreover, partnering with Russia has allowed Belarus to
obtain natural gas at reduced rates, effectively subsidizing the latter’s
economy. Some Belarusian policymakers recognized that these subsidies
would compromise the country’s autonomy, but they nevertheless
calculated that economic engagement with the West was too risky when
the costs of disengagement from Russia were certain to be high.5

1      David R. Marples, “Outpost of Tyranny? The Failure of Democratization in Belarus,”
Democratization 16, no. 4 (August 2009): 756–76, doi:10.1080/13510340903082986.
2      Clelia Rontoyanni, “Union of Belarus and Russia: The Role of NATO and the EU,” in
Security Dynamics in the Former Soviet Bloc, ed. Graeme P. Herd and Jennifer D. P. Moroney (London:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 113.
3      Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, “The Politico-Military Alliance of Russia and Belarus: ReExamining the Role of NATO and the EU in Light of the Intra-Alliance Security Dilemma,” EuropeAsia Studies 66, no. 4 (June 2014): 557–77, doi:10.1080/09668136.2014.899769.
4      Rontoyanni, “Union of Belarus,” 113.
5      Andrew Wilson and Clelia Rontoyanni, “Security or Prosperity? Belarusian and Ukrainian
Choices,” in Swords and Sustenance: The Economics of Security in Belarus and Ukraine, ed. Robert Legvold
and Celeste A. Wallander (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 43–44.
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After Vladimir Putin became the Russian president in 2000,
relations between the two countries continued to develop. For example,
cooperation in air defense deepened, which culminated in an air defense
treaty in 2009. Yet distrust and acrimony between the two governments
accompanied the growth of such linkages. Lukashenka was lukewarm to
Putin’s suggestions that the six oblasts making up Belarus should become
part of the Russian federation. He rejected other Russian proposals for
greater fiscal integration between the two countries.6 Moreover, the two
countries publicly disputed over how to price surplus natural gas that
Belarus had hitherto imported from Russia at a reduced rate and then
exported at a higher rate. The negotiations had become so testy between
Belarus and the Russian supplier Gazprom that the company cut gas
supplies to Belarus in early 2007.7
In 2009, Belarus also boycotted a summit it chaired for the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—a regional multilateral security
alliance also comprised of Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.8 The purpose of this meeting was to decide
upon an initiative to create a combat-capable force called the Collective
Operational Reaction Forces (CORF) that the CSTO would deploy to any
one of its member-states in a crisis situation. Ultimately agreeing on the
formation of CORF, Belarus first dragged its feet, exposing the tensions
that began to mark its relations with Russia and other CSTO members.
These signs of discord were not the only ones, however. Belarus has
generally been ambivalent about Russia’s pattern of interventionism in
the former Soviet space.
Notwithstanding these disagreements, close ties with Russia have
influenced Belarus’ relations with NATO and the European Union.
Lukashenka has criticized NATO expansion and even echoed Putin’s
disapproval of Ukraine’s bid for membership in that alliance. Indeed, in
2002, its declared military doctrine observed the “expansion of military
blocs and alliances [were] to the detriment of the military security of the
Republic of Belarus.”9 By contrast, Belarusian diplomacy towards the
European Union is predicated more on cynical opportunism than on
heightened threat perceptions.10 Belarus has used its relationship with the
European Union as a “bargaining chip”—an outside option that could
offer some alternative economic goods if Russia withholds support.11
Yet the European Union has sometimes lost patience with Belarus,
and its human rights record, leading to sanctions imposed in 2004. An
effort to improve relations between the supranational organization and
Belarus stalled when Lukashenka’s regime imprisoned political activists
and dissidents after the 2010 presidential elections. New sanctions
were imposed on Belarus during the ensuing period and Lukashenka
   6     Wilson and Rontoyanni, “Security or Prosperity?,” 47–49; and Pavel K. Baev, Russian Energy
Policy and Military Power: Putin’s Quest for Greatness (London: Routledge, 2008), 147.
   7     Vieira, “Politico-Military Alliance,” 567–68.
  8       John A. Mowchan, The Militarization of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Issue Paper
6-09 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, 2009), 5.
   9     Quoted in Steven J. Main, The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Belarus (Camberley, Surrey:
Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2002), 6.
10      Thomas Ambrosio, “The Political Success of Russia-Belarus Relations: Insulating Minsk
from a Color Revolution,” Demokratizatsiya 14, no. 3 (2006): 417. To be sure, the EU has supported
Belarusian pro-democracy groups in the past.
11      Vieira, “Politico-Military Alliance,” 575.
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was excluded from the Warsaw Summit of the Eastern Partnership
initiative.12 Following the October 2015 presidential elections, a report
by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe determined
very limited progress was made in Belarusian efforts to have elections
operate more democratically. The European Union subsequently lifted
most permanent sanctions while retaining the arms embargo.13

Analytical Neglect of Belarus

Although the Belarus-Russia alliance features greater nuance than
commonly presumed, the current literature on security in East Central
Europe superficially engages with Belarus. In discussing the A2/
AD capabilities that Russia has at its disposal in that region, Stephan
Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias barely mention Belarus. They note
that Belarus represents the rare instance in which Russia has gained
“strategic influence” before assuming Belarusian forces might fight
alongside their Russian counterparts in exploiting the so-called Suwałki
Gap—a corridor that lies between the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad
and Belarus, thereby forming the only mainland connection between
Poland and Lithuania.14 Still, they later imply Belarusian neutrality
would improve NATO’s odds of achieving favorable battlefield
outcomes.15Another analysis of the A2/AD problem neglects Belarus
entirely.16 One think-tank report arguing for improving NATO’s regional
deterrent posture only mentions Belarus in reference to Kaliningrad.17
A major essay, and the subsequent forum it inspired, on how NATO
should address Russia never mentions Belarus.18 Discussions of Russian
military doctrinal thinking or regional strategies often exclude Belarus.19
Some analysts have done better. Luis Simón recognizes the
importance of Belarus for NATO defense planning, writing that
“although Minsk is politically close to Moscow, it still maintains an
important degree of military autonomy in the sense Russian armed
forces do not have a significant presence in Belarusian territory; nor
12      Vieria, “Politico-Military Alliannce,” 558–59.
13      Robin Emmott, “Europe Ends Sanctions on Belarus, Seeks Better Ties,” Reuters, February
15, 2016; and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Republic of Belarus, Parliamentary Elections,
11 September 2016: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report (Warsaw: OSCE /
ODIHR, 2016).
14      Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad
Challenge,” Survival 58, no. 2 (April–May 2016): 103, 105, doi:10.1080/00396338.2016.1161906.
15      Frühling and Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD,” 107.
16      Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, “Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial
and Precision Strike Challenge in the Baltic Region,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 5 (November 2016):
12–18, doi:10.1080/03071847.2016.1253367.
17      Edward Lucas and A. Wess Mitchell, Central European Security after Crimea: The Case for
Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Defenses, Report Number 35 (Washington, DC: Center for European
Policy Analysis, 2014), 5.
18      Matthew Kroenig, “Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War,” Survival 57,
no. 1 (February–March 2015): 49–70, doi:10.1080/00396338.2015.1008295; and Steven Pifer et al.,
“Forum: NATO and Russia,” Survival 57, no. 2 (April–May 2015): 119–44, doi:10.1080/00396338
.2015.1026090.
19      Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” Survival 58, no. 4 (August–
September 2016): 7–26, doi:10.1080/00396338.2016.1207945; Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, CrossDomain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy, Proliferation Papers 54 (Paris, France: Institut
Français des Relations Internationales Security Studies Center, 2015); and Alexander Lanoszka,
“Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Europe,” International Affairs 92, no.
1 (January 2016): 175–95, doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12509.
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are they in a position to transit Belarusian territory or airspace freely.”20
Nevertheless, his analysis proceeds to suggest that growing defense ties
between these two countries (as of 2014) should lead NATO defense
planners to assume that they would cooperate with each other.21
Interestingly, a well-cited RAND study on wargames in the Baltic
region that found Russia could quickly conquer Baltic territory barely
acknowledges Belarus. To the extent that Belarus would play a role,
according to these wargames, it would be to “subject [NATO forces] to
long-range artillery and flank attacks” from its side of the Suwałki Gap
should those forces attempt to enter the Baltic region from Poland.22
Another recent wargame held in Warsaw acknowledged Belarus could
be a flashpoint in a future crisis between Russia and NATO. Indeed, it
envisioned a scenario where Russia dislodges Lukashenka from power
and installs in his place a general who proceeds to invite troops from
Russia—a scenario that might have drawn inspiration from reports of
Russian plans to send unusually large numbers of railway carriages into
Belarus in 2017 ahead of joint military exercises in September.23
That many expert analyses of regional security relations overlook
Belarus might reflect how NATO views non-NATO territory differently
because of its interest in defensive operations. But this neglect might also
reflect how Belarus has neglected its own military, weakening it so much
relative to Russia that experts feel they can make simplistic assumptions
about Belarusian behavior in a future crisis. When Belarus achieved
independent statehood, it acquired a strong military force that had
previously formed the Belarusian Military District in the Soviet Union.
Because of its geographical positioning in what would have been the rear
of the frontline forces of the Warsaw Pact, the inheritance included an
extensive array of heavy weapons, an oversized army of 240,000 military
personnel, as well as education facilities and high-tech factories capable
of making components for military equipment.24
But the military industry that Belarus inherited from the Cold
War was inappropriate for its particular defense needs. As in Ukraine,
Belarusian factories did not close the production cycle independently,
thus they remained dependent on access to Russian militaryindustrial enterprises for various weapon components.25 Given these
structural problems, Belarus had to downsize the size of its military
four-fold. Nevertheless, the government continued subsidizing, and
retaining control over, defense production. Doing so helped avoid
any social dislocations that would have ensued in a national economy
disproportionately centered on military production. To maintain the
viability of its defense industry, Belarus oriented its military production
20      Luis Simón, “Assessing NATO’s Eastern European ‘Flank,’ ” Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn
2014): 71.
21      Simón, “Assessing NATO,” 72.
22      David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank:
Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 4.
23      Arseni Sivitski, “Belarus at the Centre of Russia-NATO Wargame Simulation,” Belarus
Digest, February 13, 2017; and Arseni Sivitski, “Will Russia Occupy Belarus in 2017?,” Belarus Digest,
November 29, 2016.
24      Siarhei Bohdan, Belarusian Army: Its Capacities and Role in the Region, Analytical Paper 4 (London:
Ostrogorski Centre, 2014), 6–7.
25      Hrihorij Perepelitsa, “Military-Industrial Cooperation between Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia:
Possibilities, Priorities, Prospects,” in Legvold and Wallander, Swords and Sustenance, 132–33.
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to Russia more so than to its own army, thereby adding to its reliance on
Russia for obtaining financial resources. Consequently, Belarus limited
its own possibilities for accessing other technologies from alternative
providers.26 The European Union’s arms embargo on Belarus since 2011
compounds this problem.27
The Belarusian military thus atrophied since the country gained
independence. Defense spending has been low, never taking up
more than 1.48 percent of the gross domestic product during the
2000s.28 With badly aging equipment and a military in sore need of a
modernization program that the country can ill-afford, one analysis
surmises Belarus “would not be capable of repulsing a serious incursion
across its border.”29 The Belarusian armed forces have undertaken some
restructuring, with the army featuring not only ground forces but also
an air force, air defense systems, and special operations forces.30 Yet the
combat credibility of that air force is dubious even if about half of the
active personnel in the 48,000 strong army are in the air force and air
defense.31 Nevertheless, Belarus has sought to improve its air defenses
and to replace older combat aircraft with Sukhoi Su-30SMs by 2020.32
Whether it will succeed in these efforts remains unclear.
Though this military deficiency might indicate Belarus would have
no choice but to follow the Kremlin’s lead, it could also be evidence
of Belarusian foot-dragging on efforts to enhance interoperability.
Lest it would be dragged into an undesirable conflict, Belarus might be
trying to limit military integration with Russia. Moreover, that Russian
forces may have to traverse Belarusian territory or to use Belarusian
bases presents opportunities and challenges for NATO planners—for
example, Russian movements within Belarus would allow NATO
more time to detect potentially aggressive behavior. Still, Belarusian
cooperation is not a given.

Political Discord between Belarus and Russia

Strong reasons exist to be skeptical that Belarusian leadership would
kowtow to Russia on foreign policy matters. The best inference one can
make regards Lukashenka’s primary interest to hold onto power. Though
Lukashenka may share Putin’s dislike of Western-leaning regimes and
prodemocracy movements, he has been reluctant to support Putin’s
willingness to destabilize other former Soviet republics. Lukashenka
withheld full recognition of the two breakaway republics of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia from Russia—something Russia did following its
five-day war with Georgia in August 2008—and continued to respect
Georgia’s territorial integrity.33

26      Perepelitsa, “Military-Industrial Cooperation,” 135–41.
27      “Embargoes and Sanctions on Belarus,” GOV.UK, March 3, 2016, https://www.gov.uk
/guidance/arms-embargo-on-belarus.
28      Bohdan, “Belarusian Army,” 10.
29      The Military Balance 2016 (Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, Taylor & Francis / International
Institute for Strategic Studies [ISS], 2016), 182.
30      Bohdan, “Belarusian Army,” 8.
31      Military Balance 2016, 182.
32      The Military Balance 2017 (London: ISS, 2017), 203.
33      Vieira, “Politico-Military Alliance,” 563; and Oksana Antonenko, “A War with No Winners,”
Survival 50, no. 5 (October 2008): 26–27.

TOC

Regional Challenges

Lanoszka

81

Belarus and Russia also diverged in their stances towards Kurmanbek
Bakiyev’s deposal during the second Tulip Revolution (2010) in
Kyrgyzstan. Shortly after granting asylum to Bakiyev, Lukashenka
implicitly condemned Russia for tolerating the turmoil that unseated
the Kyrgyz leader. Russia had supported regime change in Kyrgyzstan,
having disliked Bakiyev for accepting large loans from Moscow
while allowing the United States to keep using the Manas air base to
support its operations in Afghanistan.34 Amid a recent debt dispute
with Russia, Lukashenka reportedly said “right now fraternal Ukraine
is fighting for its independence. We cannot afford to fight. We are a
peace-loving people.”35 Indeed, shortly after the Russian annexation of
Crimea, Lukashenka carefully maneuvered between Russia and Ukraine.
Despite recognizing Russia has de facto control over Crimea, he has
cooperated with the post-Maidan government in Kyiv. Lukashenka even
attended the inauguration of President Petro Poroshenko in June 2014.
He criticized the ousted former President Viktor Yanukovych for having
fled from Ukraine.36
Russian access to Belarusian military assets and territory should also
not be overstated. Russia used the Baranovichi air base between 2013
and 2016, but Russia wishes to have its own air base partly to compensate
for shortcomings in Belarus’ own contributions to their joint air defense
system. Russia currently uses two other facilities: the Gantsevichi Radar
Station and a Russian Navy communications point near the town of
Vileyka.37 Yet these facilities are not military bases per se and recent
diplomatic tensions have prevented a greater Russian military presence
in Belarus.38 Belarus has even renewed efforts to bolster its air defense
system so as to obviate further Russian deployments of fighter jets on
its own air bases.39 Thus, notwithstanding statements about loyalty to
Russia, Belarusian leaders have been unwilling to host forward-deployed
Russian forces. This reluctance persists despite how Belarus has seen
an expanding NATO presence on its western borders since the 2016
Warsaw Summit.
Lukashenka might wish to forestall a greater Russian political
presence for reasons connected to his own political survival. After all, he
may not wish for Belarus to be the next Crimea since, as Arkady Moshes
notes, some similarities exist between the two former Soviet territories.40
To begin with, sections of the Belarusian population have sympathies,
34      Kathleen Collins, “Kyrgyzstan’s Latest Revolution,” Democracy 22, no. 3 (July 2011): 156,
doi:10.1353/jod.2011.0040. On the divergence, see Vieira, “Politico-Military Alliance,” 563; and
“Belarus Ready To Accept Bakiyev—Report,” RT, April 18, 2010.
35      “Brother Ukraine Is Fighting for Its Independence—Belarus President,” Moscow Times,
January 27, 2017.
36      Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, “Ukraine’s Crisis and Russia’s Closest Allies: A Reinforced
Intra-Alliance Security Dilemma at Work,” International Spectator 49, no. 4 (December 2014): 97–111,
doi:10.1080/03932729.2014.964520. See also Andrew Wilson, “Belarus Wants Out,” Foreign Affairs,
March 20, 2014.
37      “Kremlin Pushes for Russian Airbase in Belarus after Presidential Elections,” Belarus in Focus,
April 22, 2016, http://belarusinfocus.info/society-and-politics/kremlin-pushes-russian-airbase
-belarus-after-presidential-elections.
38      Military Balance 2017, 203.
39      Siarhei Bohdan, “Thwarting Plans for a Russian Airbase, Minsk Strengthens Its Air Force,”
Belarus Digest, October 12, 2016.
40      Arkady Moshes, Belarus’ Renewed Subordination to Russia: Unconditional Surrender or Hard Bargain?,
Policy Memo 329 (Washington, DC: PONARS Eurasia, 2014). According to Moshes, another
similarity in 2014 is that Russia had a military presence in Belarus; however, that military presence
was limited and inadequate for grabbing territory and seizing strategic assets within Belarus.
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if not an affinity, for Moscow. Russian broadcast media also has a large
presence in Belarus. Though state censorship can prevent Moscow from
exploiting that presence to advance its own preferred narrative in Belarus,
Belarusians could still access Russian programming on the internet.
Hence some Belarusians were able to view an incendiary documentary
about Lukashenka aired in Russia in 2012. This information war erupted
between the two governments during a dispute over export duties on
the crude oil that Belarus was receiving from Russia.41 Moreover, just
as with the Ukrainian military in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the
integration of Belarusian armed forces with some parts of the Russian
military raises questions of loyalty. As one report observes, “unlike the
security agencies or police, the army is not [Lukashenka’s] closest ally”
and suffers from his mistrust.42
Belarus might thus be exposed to the so-called hybrid warfare
that Russia allegedly practiced in Ukraine. Specifically, Belarus may be
subject to Russian provocations at the subconventional level, and selfdeterred from responding forcefully out of a desire to avoid militarily
confronting a superior foe in Russia.43 So in 2016, Belarus unveiled a
new military doctrine—its first since 2002—explicitly discussing the
concept of hybrid war. This doctrinal innovation reflected fear that
adversaries could use subversion to destabilize, if not to unseat, the
Belarusian government.
Though the Arab Spring and the Color revolutions in the former
Soviet space might have inspired such fears, invocations of hybrid
warfare suggest at least some concern of Russian interference.44 To be
sure, a Crimea-like scenario is far-fetched. Russia probably does not want
further political instability on its borders, and an agreement between
the two governments in April 2017 to resolve an oil and gas dispute
could mean that Putin sees few acceptable alternatives to supporting
Lukashenka.45 The perceived hybrid threat could also be mostly Western
in origin since the Belarusian minister of defense obliquely asserted “all
the wars of the past 10–15 years were in effect hybrid wars.”46
Yet the European Union’s only media presence in Belarus is through
the Polish-funded Belarusian language television channel Belsat. Thus
Russia has more opportunities to subvert its ally because of their common
language and ties to members of Belarusian society. Still, Ukraine was
a much more open society wracked by greater ethnic grievances than
Belarus. Because the Belarusian state is repressive and controls media
tightly, Russia might have trouble identifying aggrieved individuals
willing to revolt against the heavy-handed Belarusian government.

41      Joanna Szostek, “Russian Influence on News Media in Belarus,” Communist and Post-Communist
Studies 48, no. 2–3 (June–September 2015): 125.
42     Bohdan, “Belarusian Army,” 8.
43     See Lanoszka, “Russian Hybrid Warfare.” For a critique of Western notions of hybrid
warfare, see Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare,’ ” Parameters 45, no. 4
(Winter 2015–16): 65–74.
44     On Russian perceptions of Western hybrid war, see Rod Thornton, “The Changing Nature
of Modern Warfare,” RUSI Journal 160, no. 4 (September 2015): 42.
45     Siarhei Bohdan, “Belarus Has Obtained Gas and Oil Concessions from Russia: But What Did
Russia Get in Exchange?,” Belarus Digest, April 11, 2017.
46     Andrei Ravkov, “All Wars of the Past 15 Years Can Be Called Hybrid Wars,” Belarusian
Telegraph Agency, February 24, 2016.
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The new Belarusian military doctrine does have a traditional
military bent. The language emphasizing increased mobility and
readiness throughout the entire country, however, implies some concern
about Russia. Minsk may be hedging against multiple threats, whatever
their origin.47 Moreover, Lukashenka disavowed the use of military
force abroad by stating “we will never fight on someone else’s territory
because we are committed to a defensive military doctrine.”48 Though
incentives not to broadcast a desire to mount armed aggression exist, the
weak posture of the Belarusian military makes this doctrine credible.
Belarus might have trouble participating in Russian military actions
against NATO countries, preferring instead to engage those countries’
forces only if NATO were to strike first.
The military deficiency could also reflect a fear of Russian entrapment
emerging from the so-called alliance dilemma. Whereas providing too
weak of a commitment to an ally might render that ally so insecure
as to fear abandonment, too strong of a commitment might embolden
an ally to undertake a riskier foreign policy than it would otherwise
adopt. Entrapment ensues when such risk-taking behavior provokes an
undesirable war, compelling the participation of the committed state.49
By limiting its defense ties with Russia, Belarus may be trying to
reduce the likelihood of being ensnared in a conflict involving NATO
but instigated by Russia. The ramshackle state of the Belarusian military
suggests it cannot fight a large-scale war with NATO forces. One
analysis concludes Belarus does not have the offensive capabilities to
attack NATO forces single-handedly, or even in tandem, with Russia.50
From Lukashenka’s perspective, a lost war could weaken his power. This
fear is well-founded: political science research has found the tenure of
nondemocratic warfighting leaders greatly depends on their victories.51
Lukashenka’s risk-aversion to anything that might undermine his rule
could mean he would prefer to be a bystander than undertake any
revisionism of his own.

Strategic Implications

Many security analysts tend to neglect Belarus when assessing the
balance between NATO and Russia. They commonly assume Belarus
would assist Russian efforts to close the Suwałki Gap, thus preventing
NATO forces in Poland from reinforcing and resupplying the Baltic
countries on the ground. Such assumptions may be unwarranted.
Belarus has reluctantly supported the Kremlin’s responses to territorial
and political disputes within the former Soviet space. Belarus provided
halting diplomatic support to Russia in its 2008 war against Georgia, and
it expressed sympathy for Ukraine amid its war with Russia. Lastly, given

47      Yauheni Preiherman, “Belarus Prepares to Adopt New Military Doctrine,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor 13, no. 40, February 29, 2016.
48      Quoted in Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Belarus Unveils New Military Doctrine amid Armenia’s
Criticism,” Defense News, April 18, 2016.
49      Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). See also Vieira,
“Politico-Military Alliance.”
50          Bohdan, “Belarusian Army,” 15. To be sure, Belarus has participated in joint military
exercises with Russia and will continue to do so, at least through the medium term. Bohdan,
“Belarusian Army,” 24–25.
51      Alexandre Debs and H. E. Goemans, “Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War,” American
Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (August 2010): 430–45, doi:10.1017/S000305541000019.
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Lukashenka’s strong preference to maintain power, and the poor state
of the Belarusian military forces, Belarus might even fear entrapment
by Russia in a war with NATO. If so, a militarized crisis between Russia
and NATO may not involve Belarus. Belarusian nonparticipation would
help NATO to isolate and to hold hostage the enclave of Kaliningrad,
while hampering Russian efforts to close the Suwałki Gap.52
For some readers, this policy implication may be an overstatement
since they may still ask whether Belarusian foreign and defense policy
matters at all. Russia could compel Belarus to accept Russian troops
on its territory regardless of Minsk’s interests in a war against NATO.
Yet consider the hypothetical scenario whereby Belarus does assert
its desire for neutrality during a crisis—a plausible course of action
given Lukashenka’s distaste for territorial revisions in the former
Soviet space and the weakness of the Belarusian military—aside from
withholding diplomatic support, Belarus could delay efforts to enhance
interoperability or provide supporting forces. These actions could
frustrate Russian calculations to help NATO. Nevertheless, if Russia
responds by undertaking such extreme measures as a direct intervention
in Belarusian domestic affairs, then this move could backfire because
opponents of both Lukashenka and Putin could mobilize in response.
Such a move could also be escalatory if NATO interprets—rightly or
wrongly—any effort to curtail Belarusian sovereignty as intending to
gain a major military advantage over Poland and the Baltic states.
NATO thus should not assume Belarus would play only a supporting
role for Russia. Although Minsk might not derail the Kremlin’s regional
ambitions, it could still frustrate them to NATO’s benefit. Moreover,
Belarus is also a complicating factor for NATO: efforts to extract
security assurances from Belarus could prove meaningless, if not
counterproductive. Indeed, NATO should not try to distance Belarus
too far from Russia (if at all possible) because doing so could cause the
Kremlin to retaliate lest it loses a treaty ally. With respect to planning war,
NATO should think through several contingencies. For one, defense
planners need to consider their readiness to fight a Belarus that appears
to be a reluctant and hesitant Russian ally. For another, how NATO
should prepare defensive operations could differ if it expects Belarus
to provide frontline forces fighting alongside Russian forces, frontline
forces fighting for uniquely Belarusian objectives, frontline forces
mounting a diversionary attack, or supporting forces handling rear-area
security or pacification. Rather than take for granted certain notions
of the Belarus-Russia alliance, analysts should be more mindful of the
various ways Belarus could impact the regional security environment,
however subtly.

52      Frühling and Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD,” 107.
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